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This thesis was developed as a contribution to international relations field as a research 
project to identify and analyse how conflict resolution impact and contribute to regional 
integration. 
 
The reasons behind why states resort to wars, and people resort to violence in trying to 
resolve their differences, was the aim of this research work, with special focus on the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) organisation and how it dealt with the 
Lesotho conflict in 1998.  
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African continent has most of its countries ravaged by wars and domestic conflicts 
ranging from ethnical, cultural, political party ideology differences and in some cases 
based on colonial background. The regional organisations have been embroiled in 
resolving conflicts more than focusing on the regional integration efforts for economic 
growth. 
 
Supporting the above statement, Ramsbotham (2006) refers to the speech given by 
Koffi Anan, the former UN Secretary-General, who said: “The nature of political power 
in many African states, together with the real and perceived consequences of capturing 
and maintaining power, is a key source of conflict across the continent. It is frequently 
the case that political victory assumes a ‘winner takes all’ form with respect to wealth, 
resources and patronage and the prestige and prerogatives of office. Where there is 
insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of transparency of regimes, inadequate 
checks and balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means to 
change or replace leader-ship or lack of respect for human rights, political control 
becomes excessively important, and the stakes becomes dangerously high”. 
(Ramsbotham, 2006: P102) 
 
The above quote is reflective of what is causing conflicts and wars in African states 
including the conflict of Lesotho 1998. While the Lesotho conflict 1998 broke out just 
after the announcement of the election results, it requires some intense study in order 
to find the causes of such conflicts, and this study is trying to search for the answers to 
such questions. The question is whether the political parties realised that they would 
not be in power and therefore set out to convince the citizens that the political party to 
be in power was not to be trusted to distribute the resources for the benefit of all citizens. 
When citizens do not have trust in a political party or the ruling party, they cannot vote 
for it, and if the results are not in their favour, they will resort to violent means to assume 




The SADC region has not been spared of this kind of conflict; it has been embroiled in 
instability or wars of liberation such as in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique 
and South Africa. The internal conflicts in these countries affected their neighbouring 
states, especially those countries that somehow supported such struggles by 
accommodating or providing the base for the liberation movements, as well as weapons 
and soldiers (Ngomba, 2008: P15) 
 
These conflicts ended up involving the entire region. When the other states faced 
damage of infrastructure and the killing of their people, they decided to collaborate to 
secure themselves, which resulted in the formation of the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference in 1980. This later changed to an organization 
called the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. The formation 
of the SADC was aimed at integrating the region for economic growth, peace and 
stability. The focus of the study in the case of Lesotho’s conflict of 1998 is therefore to 
determine the causes of conflict, who were the role players, and how such conflict was 
resolved by central institutions such as the SADC.  
 
According to Ngoma (2005), the SADC is also defined by a history of conflict such as 
those in Angola, DRC, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Lesotho between 
1988 and 1998, with complex causes rooted on political, cultural differences, economic, 
domestic and international relations. In 1996 the leaders of the member states of the 
SADC realised the need to establish an organ on politics, defence and security that 
would be responsible for peace and security, economic integration and development of 
the region. In this case, the study will, amongst others, determine the role of the SADC 
Organ on Politics, Defence Security and Cooperation (OPDSC) in the Lesotho conflict 
of 1998 (Ngoma, 2005) 
 
1.2 Objectives of the study  
The first chapter provides the study on peace and security with reference to the Lesotho 
conflict of 1998 which is a good case study to illustrate the role of Southern Africa 
Development Community ‘s peace and security role. The second chapter focuses on the 
role of regional organisations in peace and security and provide the definitions and 
theoretical concepts on conflict, terminologies on conflict and conflict resolution. The 
study will provide the definitions of the concepts used in this thesis and further outline 
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the research methodology followed as well as the limitations of the study. The third 
chapter focuses on normative and instructional framework of SADC’s peace and 
security role at the time and an overview of the Lesotho conflict. The fourth chapter 
will reflect the role played by the SADC on the Lesotho conflict of 1998. Finally, the 
fifth chapter provides the analysis and findings of the study and reflect on their 
empirical and theoretical significance.  
 
1.3 Regionalism 
According to Bӧrzel (1970), regions comprise groupings of territorial units in 
geographical proximity. The study of regionalism touches on various contested fields 
such as political dimension; therefore, for the region to obtain political, social and 
economic importance, it should show some degree of mutual interdependence (Bӧrzel, 
1970: P4).  
 
Some of exponents on regionalism define the ’region’ as the consciousness of residents 
or a population within a geographical space who identify themselves consciously on 
their commonalities and in distinction from to other groups in some other regions 
(Khosa, 1994: P11). 
 
McCormick (2011) argues that regionalism is usually more focused on economic 
cooperation, including the promotion of trade and investment. Regionalism could be 
defined based on member states who identify themselves with common goals such as 
in addressing poverty, collectively promoting efficiency and creating opportunities 
within their communities, creating a pool of resources and broad philosophical goals on 
unity and peacekeeping (McCormick, 2011: P15).  
 
Whereas Bӧrzel (1970) and Khosa (1994) agree that the region is based on geographical 
proximity, McCormick (2011) defines regionalism based on political and social identity 
by such states that are striving to achieve similar objectives. The three authors agree 
that for regionalism to be sustainable, it needs collective efforts by the affected 
communities in dealing with their challenges.  Such communities are collectively to 
address certain issues within their geographical space. These would include addressing 
challenges such as eradication of poverty and peacekeeping. In order to achieve these 
gaols, there will be treaties and protocols outlining goals and terms, and the creation of 
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new regional institutions charged with working towards achieving those goals. In this 
context, the study will provide the basis for the establishment of the SADC and make 
an analysis of whether it does meet such principles of regionalism. The discussion on 
the establishment of the SADC will be more focused on peacekeeping with respect to 
the Lesotho conflict of 1998. (McCormick, 2011: P16). 
 
Asante (1997) purports that Africa needs to develop a strategy that can be shared by 
most of the policy makers and economists for recognition of dynamic regional 
cooperation and integration. In emphasising his view, Asante quotes the then President 
of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere’s opinion that “regionalism could be achieved through 
developing a gradual process of economic integration”.  Asante (1997) further argues 
that for African countries to realise regionalism, they need to develop strategies 
addressing integration processes in the continent through the facts and text that aims to: 
a) Foster understanding of economic integration as a key element for African 
development 
b) Explain the logic of the dynamic process 
c) Enhance the reader’s appreciation of economic integration for achievement of 
national, sub-regional socio-economic goals 
d) Increase awareness of challenges in the interaction and regional environment to 
assist African policy makers in formulating and implementing appropriate policies 
e) Provide readers with comparative experiences in operating integration schemes in 
other parts of the world as solutions to problems encountered in African integration 
(Khosa & Muthien, 1994: P12).  
 
1.4 Regionalism in Southern Africa  
According to Poku (1994), the Southern Africa region’s politico-economic landscape 
is changing. The changes have been brought about by the ravages of conflict which has 
led to the realization of the importance of regionalism. Additionally, the desire for 
greater regionalism along economic lines has become an important area of focus by the 
politicians and academic elites. This ideology of regionalism is supported by the World 
Bank as it is reflected in its policy which states “program towards market integration 
and cooperation in a whole range of economic, technical, environmental, food security, 




As Lee (2003) points out, the major challenges of regionalism in the SADC is the 
struggle to integrate economically. The other challenge is integration into the world 
economy that is characterised by processes of globalisation and regionalism in Africa 
in the larger context. Political instability within the SADC region also poses questions 
of serious economic and political dynamics that impact on the implementation of 
effective strategy for regionalism. The other challenge faced by the SADC region is 
lack of political commitment by African leadership, which results in poor market 
integration (Lee, 2003: P235)   
 
Regionalism is also defined as the adoption of a regional project by a formal regional 
economic organisation designed to enhance the political, economic, social, cultural, and 
security integration and/or cooperation of member states. The generic definition of 
regionalism is regarded by some as a process that concerns at least two societies within 
a region, enhancing their social and/ or economic integration or interaction.  Lee (2003) 
quotes Bach (2001:2), who argues that the argents of regionalism can be driven by state 
or non-state actors such as the informal sector, non-governmental actors and media 
companies.  In this context and for the purposes of this study, regionalism will be 
defined as the process by which state and non-state actors seek to enhance their 
economic, political, cultural, social, and security interaction with society within, 
through formal or informal structures. It can be argued, therefore, that if regionalism or 
regional integration is driven by state, there will always be much emphasis on economic 
growth and development for such a geographical area within a particular society (Lee, 
2003: P9) 
   
1.5 Economic integration 
The tenets of the economic integration concept argue that, if the trade is not restricted 
and is free, countries tend to concentrate on the production of goods and services they 
will supply efficiently. The SADC, as an organization that aims to integrate the 
countries within its jurisdiction, enabled the individual countries to produce such 
products more efficiently than other countries and trade in the region capitalising on 
free agreements such as the SACU. However, the SACU cannot be seen as the main 
tool for regional integration because not all SADC countries are SACU members 




Farrell (2005), who quotes Gavin and Lombard as exponents on economic theories of 
integration, argues that the regionalism of the 1990s differs from that of the 1960s in 
many ways. Their reflection is that the contemporary integration is where smaller 
countries are willing to cooperate with a large neighbouring country, which is stronger 
economically than they are. The regional integration in this process involves going 
beyond liberalisation of tariffs to include the removal of regulatory barriers relating to 
liberalisation of services and investment issues. The argument by Farrell (2005) is 
reflective of the situation of Lesotho as a smaller and economically weaker country than 
South Africa as the stronger country economically. Therefore, Lesotho entered into a 
relationship that would lift its regulations as far as liberalisation of tariffs and 
investment were concerned, such as being the SACU member. The structural changes 
on contemporary integration theory emphasises the transformation on economic 
integration, the interaction between trade and investments as well as the role of 
institutional arrangements as incentives for regional integration. The SACU, in this 
instance, reflects all this regional integration concept within the SADC region. South 
Africa is seen to have been playing the role of regional hegemony as smaller countries 
such as Eswatini (then known as Swaziland), Lesotho and Botswana cooperated to gain 
on trade and investments by removing the regulatory barriers for liberalisation of trade 
and investments (Farrell, 2005). 
 
1.6 Economic stability  
As can be noted in this study, some of the causes of conflicts are due to scarce resources. 
It is, therefore, critical for regionalism to be effective that there is economic stability as 
that will contribute to economic growth and job creation. Economic stability is the 
backbone for successful regional integration towards regionalism by undertaking 
research to assess the readiness of member states towards macroeconomic adjustment. 
The study reveals that most of the SADC member states are still holding on to or are 
committed to achieving their national goals and objectives, rather than prioritising the 
regional goals. For the SADC to achieve macroeconomic stability, member states 
would have to surrender or relegate their macroeconomic policy-making powers to a 
sub-regional level. The other factor is that the economic policies are not harmonised, 
creating challenges for an integrated market towards regionalism. The major challenge 
facing the SADC region in achieving the macroeconomic stability, is the diverse 
economic policies, different structures and sizes and the adjustment problems and 
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capabilities of addressing such problems. Further on, member states will need to share 
information regarding their macroeconomic environment, how they are made in order 
for member states to understand how their macroeconomic policies impact on each 
other (Lee, 2003: P239) 
 
1.7 Political stability 
The success of regionalism and economic stability in the SADC is much dependent on 
political stability, as emphasised by the President of Malawi, Bakili Muluzi, in his 
capacity as the Chair of the SADC during the Summit held in Blantyre in 2001, who 
said, “The efforts for regionalism and economic stability will be undermined if there is 
no peace and political stability”. It was during the time of the SADC Summit in Malawi, 
that member states expressed their concerns regarding the ongoing conflict in Angola, 
DRC and Zimbabwe. The conflict in those three countries negatively affected the 
SADC region as none of its member states were able to participate in the SADC Free 
Trade Areas (FTA) negotiations. The Summit further noted that member states were 
channelling their resources into resolving conflicts and therefore could not contribute 
towards regional integration (Lee, 2006: P241). 
 
1.8 Political commitment to regionalism 
Lee (2006:244) argues that, unless the SADC political leaders ensure that there is 
commitment to stabilise the region politically, through tight peace and security 
measures, the regionalism agenda will never be realised. The objectives of regionalism 
can only be successful if the political leaders are prepared to sacrifice their short-term 
national interest for the long-term regional interests. The success of regionalism is, 
therefore, dependent on the ceding of sovereignty by member states and rationalising 
their membership to regional economic organisation. It is clear that from such Summit, 
the SADC member states expected South Africa also to show its leadership as the 
economic giant in the SADC region and the continent at large.  South Africa was, 
therefore, not expected to continue taking any actions that would be counterproductive 
towards the regional integration agenda. As such a move was regarded to be positive, it 
was assumed that the domestic and international investors would be confident that 





1.9 Research Question 
The focus of this study is to make an analysis of “What is the role of a regional 
organisation in domestic conflicts resolution, using the case study of the SADC 
intervention on the conflict in Lesotho of 1998. The study further reviews the role 
played by regional organisations in resolving conflicts amongst its member states and 
their impact on regional integration. The analysis will be made on the impact made by 
SADC on resolving the Lesotho conflicts 1998 and the role of other institutions such as 
the government, media, political parties and the neighbouring states. 
 
The violent activities that took place as a result of disputes surrounding the election 
results in Lesotho in 1998, was a crisis that led to internal conflict between the political 
parties and the citizens. Those leading the campaigns on disputing the election results 
followed the proper procedures in the process of disputing the election results. Firstly, 
they approached the relevant institutions such as the Constitutional Court hoping that it 
would grant their demands for the seating government to step down or nullify the 
election results. Secondly, they went to seek police clearance for their march to the 
Monarch and to demand that he nullify the election results as well as dissolve the 
government of the day.  
 
1.10 Research Methodology 
Though interviews would have been one of the best options, the study did not follow 
an empirical approach as such an approach has limitations due to the sensitivity of the 
topic. The Lesotho conflict of 1998 was resolved through the use of armed forces, 
particularly South Africa’s involvement. In this regard, most of information is in the 
custodianship of Departments such as Defence, Security, Intelligence, Presidency and 
International Relations, and as such, it poses challenges in obtaining information on the 
reasons behind South Africa’s role, as it might be classified confidential’ or ‘top secret’ 
within the government’s policies. In view of these challenges, the study focused more 
on the existing literature such as books from the university libraries, journals and other 
authentic documents such as government gazettes. It is the qualitative approach that has 
been applied as the topic deals with human behaviour rather than measuring of 




In order to comprehend and make efficient analysis of the impact of the SADC 
interventions in the Lesotho conflict, the theories and approaches that define the 
characteristics of actors and behavioural patterns leading to the integration while some 
might provide strategies for conflict resolution were considered. Noting that the 
Lesotho conflict took place some years back, the collection of data was based on 
relevant materials for analysing the literature that includes, but is not limited to, books 
from libraries, newspaper clips, journals, and government gazettes. 
 
1.11 Limitations of the study 
The scope of the research on this thesis focuses on the role played by the SADC in 
resolving the Lesotho conflict of 1998 and whether the strategies applied succeeded or 
failed. Conflict resolution implies that the parties may formally agree on the disputed 
areas without resorting to armed violence. The research also considers the role players 
in the Lesotho conflict and the impact of mediation and military intervention to assist 
in identifying whether the SADC acted as a regional organisation or whether it was 
influenced by certain individual member states such as South Africa on the process and 
decisions taken to resolve the Lesotho conflict of 1998. The research did not focus on 
the other conflicts that occurred in Lesotho at other times and the rest of the conflicts 
in which the SADC intervened in the region such as in DRC, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, 
Mozambique, and others. 
 
Though the study is not aimed at defining the SADC organisation; however, it will be 
important to show the structural formation of the SADC so as to bring better 
understanding on the role and implications for the SADCs’ interventions on the 
conflicts in the region. In this regard, the summary on the sub-structures will be 













THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS ON PEACE AND SECURITY  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The methodology followed in this study is the neo-functionalism theory that is central 
to regional integration, which is anchored on three factors that influence regional 
integration. According to Wulf’s perspective (2009), regional organisations have 
acritical role when it comes to conflict prevention and resolution. As is generally 
known, the UN system is overburdened in dealing with international conflicts, to an 
extent that the international communities have realized that it is better to task the 
regional organisations with conflict prevention and peacekeeping responsibility. In this 
study the focus is on the SADC’s role in the Lesotho conflict 1998 Wulf 2009 further 
point out that there are still weaknesses amongst regional organisations in dealing with 
conflict prevention and management functions which limit their future role. In most 
conflict or war zone areas, the UN and regional organisations collectively deal and share 
responsibilities for peacekeeping. This can be seen taking place in in Europe and Africa, 
where the African Union, for example, is taking on new responsibilities. Wulf (2009, 
P7-11). 
 
Wulf further argues that though the regional and sub-regional organisations are 
potentially partnering in conflict management, in practice, they often fail to live up to 
expectations due to several weaknesses. Where there is lack of common values, political 
differences exist within regional organisations that creates barriers for joint response. 
The differences maybe based on the different types of governments especially if there 
are democratic and authoritarian governments, or religious, ethnic and cultural 
differences. In the case of Lesotho conflict 1998, there was resemblance of Contested 
sovereignty. South Africa responded quickly by sending its troops without waiting for 
the SADC to take required interventions through its delegated troops. The other 
challenge for regional organisations is the inadequate procedures, human material and 
financial resources making it difficult to implement decisions and execute sanctions. 
As regional organisations are based on collective of nation states, they have limited role 
to play when it comes to conflict management and peace keeping due to lack of political 
agreement. (Wulf, 2009. P13-18) 
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2.2 Role of international organisations on conflict resolution 
 
2.2.1 United Nations 
The UN is regarded as the main body for maintaining international peace and security 
globally, and has proven itself in many wars since the end of the Cold War. The UN 
runs its affairs through its structures such as the UN Security Council, the UN General 
Assembly and the Secretary–General. The role played by the UN in resolving conflicts 
has been devolved down to regional bodies such as the African Union and sub-regional 
bodies like the SADC. All these organisations were established with the aim of 
maintaining peace and security as one of the major objectives. Seaman, (2014) illustrate 
the role of international organisations in the area of peace and security stating that the 
United Nations charter, which in the preamble, provided for the reaffirmation faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women and of nations large and small. The UN has created platforms 
and established norms that countries could follow and all people to live by and hoping 
that as the superpower conflict comes to an end, the organisation would become an 
instrument to mobilise collective concerns. The United Nations as the umbrella body in 
dealing with peace and security on human rights and conflict resolution, has become 
the platform for the establishment of regional organisations to assist in conflict 
resolution and observing human rights within their jurisdiction areas. (Seaman, 2014. 
P125-127) 
 
2.2.2 Organisation for African Unity (OAU) 
In Africa, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was established and also got 
involved in working with the United Nations in mediation in conjunction with the 
United nations. In 1998 the two organisations jointly worked together on resolving the 
dispute between Ethiopia and Eretria through negotiating a peace agreement which 
came into force in 2000. One of the main aims of creating or establishing regional 
organisations is to strengthen integration, manage and resolve conflict, keeping peace 
and security amongst its member states. The regional organisations are platforms for 
their member states to consult and negotiate during or potential conflicts.  One of the 
examples on the role played by regional organisations in settling disputes, is the case of 
Morocco and Algeria in 1963, where the OAU established an ad hoc commission that 
facilitated meetings between the two-member states to resolve the border issues, 
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resulting in the withdrawal of troops, the return of prisoners and restoration of 
diplomatic relations. (Merrils, 2011, P264) 
 
The Organization for African Unity (OAU), has clear regulations and protocols to be 
followed when there are conflicts or wars within its member states. However, the OAU 
seems not to have been well equipped to restore peace and promote democracy. The 
OAU Charter gave privilege to states’ security over human security as it insisted on no-
interference into internal affairs of member states. According to Southall (2008), the 
OAU could not stabilize the conflicts in weak African states. Secondly, the OAU could 
not deal with some of the issues to be addressed through its programs aimed at 
regionalization such as alleviating of poverty, fighting diseases, repressive 
governments, and stopping coups and civil wars in most of the African states. (Southall, 
2008: P37-38). 
 
2.2.3 African Union 
In 1990, the African continent gathered and started discussions that led to the 
establishment of the African Union (AU), which was inaugurated in Durban, South 
Africa on 9 July 2002. The AU was formed with the aim to enforce peace among the 
African states while growing their economy and fighting poverty and diseases 
collectively. It is in this process that South Africa and Nigeria, as the major economies, 
pushed for reformation through their competing policy strategies during the summit in 
Algiers, Algeria. The African Union also has the Security Council that deals with 
decisions on how to intervene during the conflicts in its member states. In the Lesotho 
conflict the intervention from the SADC was not seen to be elevated to the AU level, 
probably because it was not so tense, even though there were lives lost (Southall, 2008: 
P38). 
 
2.3 Coordination of mediation  
The regional organisational may avoid using its officials in resolving conflicts, but may 
appoint a third party to mediate on its behalf. In 1972, when the deposed President from 
Uganda took refuge in Tanzania, war broke out and the OAU appointed the President 
of Somalia to intervene on the disputes between Uganda and Tanzania on the war that 
broke out after the supporters of the deposed President of Uganda invaded the capital 
city, resulting in Uganda bombing the Tanzanian border villages.  Another process that 
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the regional organisation may use effectively in dealing with conflict is the inquiry and 
conciliation provided there are necessary resources and institutions. Though most of 
these methods in dealing with disputes by regional organisations are between two 
conflicting states, the study on Lesotho 1998 conflict was not amongst different states, 
but conflict within the various political parties which included the involvement of the 
limitary forces. (Merrils, 2011, P266) 
 
2.4 Limitations of regional organisations 
Though regional organisations are established for the purposes of bringing peace and 
stability within the region, there are challenges in providing the resources for supporting 
the mission to be carried out. At times the regional organisation may not have enough 
human and financial resources to deal with the conflict situation and therefore may need 
political support from the involved parties. As regional organisations are institutions 
with a large geographical scope made up of various states, some member states may be 
more interested than others and those are factors that can limit the possibility of 
concerted regional action significantly. In the Lesotho conflict 1998, it was South 
Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe that were involved more than other SADC member 
states. (Merrils, 2014, P272) 
 
2.5 Definition of Concepts  
In this study, the definitions of some of the relevant concepts will be provided in order 
to give an overview and to assist in analysing the key concepts, such as regionalism, 
neo-functionalism, conflict. and conflict resolution and how they were applied by the 
SADC in resolving the Lesotho conflict of 1998. The research will reflect on concepts 
such as federalism and how these concepts relate to regional integration and/or 
influence regionalism. 
 
2.6 Role of Theory 
One of exponents on theory is Hauss (2001) who argues that “theory” is the centre of 
conflict resolution, when quoting political figures such as Winston Churchill in solving 
international disputes. Some people may not necessarily think first of the role of theory, 
even though theory is vital to their work. Haus further argues that everyone applies 
theories all the time, even though they may not be aware on how theories influence their 
thinking, or even that they are using them. Theories serve as mental lenses through 
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which we view and interpret the world. According to Haus, academically there is no 
simple or universally accepted definition of theory. He defines that theory as an attempt 
to reach regional conclusions about a broad body of material. Scholars of regionalism 
argue that empirical theories seek to explain why certain phenomena occur, and 
therefore, focus on cause and effect relationships. Thus, empirical theories of conflict 
resolution analyse why at some times, we can settle our disputes peacefully, while at 
others, we turn to violence and war (Hauss, 2001: P13). 
 
Normative theories are designed to prescribe what we should do in dealing with those 
phenomena. A normative theory would lay out options that should be used in trying to 
reach a certain gaol, such as a non-violet outcome that satisfies all parties without 
conflict. The study on the Lesotho conflict of 1998 may have some components of the 
two theories however, as there is no correct empirical or normative theory, it is only 
when we ask ourselves questions such as what ought to happen, as most actions are 
influenced by the motives of the political leaders (Hauss, 2001: P14). 
 
2.7 Theories of regional integration 
Lesotho, as a signatory member state to the SADC protocols and treaties, it is compelled 
to abide by the rules and regulations that are aimed at building and enforcing a political 
and an economically stable region. It is, therefore, important to realise that the political 
instability in Lesotho had a negative impact on regional integration within the SADC 
region. It is only through a stable region that the objectives of dealing with challenges 
such as poverty alleviation, conflict resolutions are collectively addressed.  
 
According to Mattheis (2014), regional integration was established as an academic field 
by political science scholars in the 1940s. It was after World War II that two main 
perspectives emerged in Europe, leading to the impression of a post–nationalist future 
on idealistic views on integration. The theories of integration were the outcomes of the 
debate amongst scholars who had a central view on the landscape of international 
relations theory which was dominated by realist visions of states in international 
anarchy. The greatest challenge was around the necessary preconditions of the new 
process for integrating the European states. It was during the academic debates focusing 
on European evolution on regional integration that theoretical approaches such as neo-
functionalism and inter-governmentalism emerged. The debates amongst scholars 
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resulted in agreement on dealing with interdependence amongst various nation-states 
and centralisation of political capabilities beyond national governments. Whereas there 
were differing ideologies amongst the scholars, it was only around 1989 that the 
theoretical foundations for the study of regionalism were provided (Mattheis, 2014). 
 
Bӧrzel et al. (2012) agree with Moravcsik that regional integration should be 
understood as a result of bargaining processes between member states. The state is seen 
as a transmission belt for the citizens’ interests and therefore becomes the primary unit 
for analysis. Bӧrzel et al. (2012) further raise the point that, according to neo-
functionalists, regional integration advocates for functional spill-overs in terms of 
context of interdependence. In cases where the domestic elites shift their attention over 
the nation state, due to increasing transitional exchange or prompted by the belief that 
their problems cannot be resolved domestically, and in line with this concept, one can 
attest to the fact that the Lesotho conflict of 1998 may have been triggered by political 
spill-overs resulting in the intervention of the SADC (Bӧrzel et al, 2012: P5). 
 
In order to understand how the SADC has been organised and its responsibilities in 
dealing with conflict, it can be deduced from Lee’s (2003:8) definition of regionalism 
in which he refers to two types, the first being formal and the second.  the networking 
regionalism. The formal regionalism is defined as being represented by institutional 
forms of cooperation or integration as considered to be the aggregation and fusion into 
broader units of existing territories or fields of intervention. When the conflict broke 
out in Lesotho, the SADC had the responsibility to intervene through its organised 
formations such as the organ for political, defence and security issues in order to 
strengthen regional integration (Lee, 2003: P8) 
 
2.8 Functionalism theory 
One of the exponents on functionalism theory is Harrison (1974), who advocates for it 
as one of the competing lines of thought for federalism as it deals with specific policy 
areas for choosing cooperation over unilateralism. It can be noted that both 
functionalists and federalists were concerned about the fact that nationalism and 
anarchy were dividing the political system into rival territories and threatening the 




The functionalists took the direction of establishing an international community on 
national technocracy and functional cooperation that would be able to resolve conflicts 
and serve the welfare of all citizens in Europe. This functionalism theory provides the 
basis for the establishment of the SADC, which is the organisation that is central to 
conflict resolution, including in the Lesotho conflict (Harrison, 1974). 
 
The functionalists concentrated on establishing a common agenda for the citizens, 
allowing them to be part of the solutions for their own differences leading to flexible 
cooperation. On the other hand, the federalists dealt with the establishment of effective 
centralised institutions. In contrast to realist thinking, the resulting pragmatic and 
technocratic maxim, “form follows function” implied that integration would extend to 
the global community of connected transitional organisations, with each specialising on 
defined functions. According to Mattheis (2014), the functionalism opted for 
monopolising sovereignty within the state while communitarian issues would be 
depoliticised. The common institutions did not rely on territorially bound national 
interests but depended on functional needs. The integration through a common 
understanding of cultural differences and common efforts on security maintained within 
a particular region, would convert itself into a formalised community that develops into 
a political community providing a common identity. It is these integration theories that 
offered an alternative to realist thinkers in political science, as it did not consider states 
to be acting solely according to power politics, but dealt with them as emerging 
dependency interactions and community building based on national states (Mattheis, 
2014).  
 
2.9 Neo-functionalism theory 
Mattheis (2014) expresses that a neo-functionalism theory is a reformed version of the 
functionalism theory that consists of elements of federalism of central institutions. The 
neo-functionalism is characterised by two main actors next to national states in its 
process of regional integration; the first of these is the supra-national organisation itself 
and coalitions of national interest groups pushing for integration. The second is that the 
core of neo-functionalism was a spill-over concept that explains the integration process 
by the European countries in the 1960/70 period, while reinforcing the convergence of 
the national interest. The neo-functionalism theory explains that once states agree to 
relinquish their responsibilities to the regional organisation in uncontroversial 
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economic and social areas, it gives birth to a dynamic multi-actor institution where the 
states expand their competencies (Mattheis, 2014). 
 
When the national states transfer some of their specific functions, for the purposes of 
regional integration, to a regional organisation, the neo-functionalism theory advocates 
that such a process will have to be through agreements by national states. The neo-
functionalism is not based on a learning process among citizens such as the 
functionalism advocates for, but through an engaged process. The theory seems to 
suggest that the regional integration process moves from low to high politics, leading 
to the establishment of a super state overcoming nation states (Mattheis, 2014). 
 
It is argued that the functionalism theory tends to be politically biased and therefore too 
abstract. According to Haas (1958), the neo-functionalism is a theory of regional 
integration which is aimed at interdependency amongst nations for economic growth. 
Secondly, those who apply it aim to strengthen organisational capacity to resolve 
disputes and build international legal regimes. Thirdly, it develops the supra-national 
market rules that replace national regulatory regimes. In this case, Lesotho could not 
deal with conflict in its territories alone. The intervention from the SADC was needed, 
as Lesotho is dependent on its neighbours for its economic growth and political stability  
 
Jarvis (1994) agrees with Haas’s who was optimistic that the modern transcending 
ideology of defence, and foreign policy pursuits as the motivating forces of 
governments. For Haas, the demands by societies for their welfare were efficiently 
addressed through cooperation than resorting to war. In this respect, Haas defined the 
differences in functionalism theory that the welfare dominated policies and economies 
are guaranteed over politics.  (Jarvis, 1994. P17-20). 
 
2.10 Systems theory 
Hauss (2001) argues that the systems theory is a win-win conflict resolution with the 
outcomes that are empirical and normative. The analyst of this system needs to explore 
how the behaviour of one actor affects the other actors. In the Lesotho conflict of 1998, 
this theory could be applied in that it would assist in realising how the actions of South 
Africa’s intervention affected the rest of the SADC member states that became 
involved. Furthermore, the system theory leads to medium- and long-term effects of the 
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actions of the actors on the entire system. In order to understand the current situation, 
it is important to explore the historical roots. The exponents of the systems theory 
provide three aspects that force the analysts to consider all actors, not just states, and 
focus on international actors and not only geopolitical ones. As it brings the intellectual 
picture to light, it forces the use of a much longer-term perspective in which the 
rationality of traditional theories in general and zero-sum decision making in particular, 
lose much of their lustre (Hauss, 2001, P15). 
 
2/11 Theories of conflict resolution 
Ramsbotham et al, (2011) explain that some of the theorists such as Machiavelli, Hume, 
Hobbes and Roseau argue that conflict is a result of different human desires. Whereas 
Machiavelli states that conflict is caused by the desire for self-preservation and power, 
Hobbes reflects that the three principal causes of quarrel in a state of nature are 
competition for gain, fear of insecurity and defence of honour. Hume argues that the 
underlying conditions for human conflict are triggered by scarcity of resources and 
limited altruism. whereas, according to Rousseau, the state of war is born from the 
social state itself (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). 
 
2.12 Conflict resolution theory 
In dealing with conflict, one needs to understand the theories, such as conflict resolution 
theory, as that will assist in understanding whether the Lesotho conflict was resolved to 
the satisfaction of the parties involved. Conflict takes place between two parties or 
groups. The scholars working in other fields argue that it is impossible to anticipate a 
win-win outcome that would satisfy all parties involved in conflict. However, the 
scholars do agree that a win-win situation can materialise only if all or most of the 
parties understand that it is in everyone’s interest to reach a mutually satisfying 
agreement. Therefore, such parties may collectively look for new and creative solutions 
to their problems through focusing on their general goals and not their specific 
demands. (Hauss, 2001, P16). 
 
The conflict theory resolution requires the parties also to treat each other with respect 
and dignity. The differing parties may as well use trained and neutral mediators or other 
“third parties” to help antagonists see new options in order to reach an agreement. The 
parties need also to see conflict as part of a larger relationship that can improve or 
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deteriorate over time, depending on the choices they make.  In the case of the Lesotho 
conflict of 1998, this conflict resolution was applied when the situation was tense and 
uncontrollable: the government of Lesotho approached the South African government 
to send the team led by Judge Pius Langa to mediate. As the Lesotho political parties 
were not satisfied with the outcomes of the Langa Commission report, they approached 
the SADC as the other neutral party to intervene so that an amicable solution could be 
reached (Hauss, 2001, P17). 
 
2.13 Conceptualising Conflict 
During the Lesotho conflict in 1998, government properties and businesses such as 
those of South African origin were targeted and damaged. There were citizens and 
soldiers who lost their lives, and some people who were physically harmed. Though the 
conflict in Lesotho did not claim a huge number of lives lost, it can be conceptualised 
as negative conflict. Bassey (2007) is one of the exponents on conflict resolution who 
uses the concept of positive and negative conflict. In his view, positive conflict leads to 
positive change and development, while negative conflict promotes or produces 
negative results such as physical harm, deaths, destruction of property, and so on. In 
that concept, positive conflict is regarded to be constructive while negative one is 
considered to be destructive. (Bassey, 2007) 
 
The two scholars who argues about what conflict is, are Jeong and Deng. Whereas 
Jeong (1999, P12) describes conflict as a contentious process that involves interpersonal 
or inter-group interaction that takes place within a social context., Deng’s (1999) view 
is that “conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction and an unavoidable 
concomitant of choices and decisions”. In some instances, conflict is referred to 
situations where a minority group that does not agree with the policies and system of 
the government or political party in power, resist through violent actions. Deng, 1999: 
P33) 
 
2.14 Terminology on conflict 
In their explanation of defining conflict, Ramsbotham et al. (2006) argue that the terms 
used in literature and in general usage can be confusing, therefore the following 
definitions could be used in this thesis so as to be able to make an analysis of the Lesotho 
conflict of 1998. Though these scholars refer to conflict as the pursuit of incompatibility 
20 
 
goals by different groups, and that it needs a broader span of time and a wider class of 
struggle than armed conflict, they agree that the term would be used to refer to political 
conflict whether it is pursued by peaceful means or by the use of force. (Ramsbotham 
et al, 2006: P27). 
 
Ramsbotham, (2006) defines conflict by the manner in which it was handled or 
occurred, such as the use of arms, referred to as armed conflict. There is violet or deadly 
conflict which is similar to armed force. but may include one- sided violence such as 
genocide against unarmed civilians. Conflict settlement occurs when the differing 
parties reaches an agreement to settle political conflict. The Lesotho conflict of 1998 
were resolved in a manner that could be defined as conflict management and conflict 
resolution. The latter referring to the limited ways to settle and containment of violent 
conflict. Whereas conflict resolution may refer to a situation where most of the root 
causes of conflict have been resolved, it sometimes takes place through negotiation 
processes whereby all parties involved come together with the intention to settle their 
differences amicably. In the Lesotho conflict of 1998, there were interventions from the 
third parties, however, some third parties such as the government of South Africa did 
not do it voluntarily, but was forced in the interest of defending its own interest. 
(Ramsbotham et al., 2006: P26-29). 
 
2.15 Nature of conflict 
Some of the scholars define conflict based on the focus of their study or research on 
wars fought between countries and on battle deaths in fighting between the armies of 
internationally recognised states. According to Hauss (2001) the revolutionary wars 
where the colonised people who fought for their freedom, still remain the focus of 
theoretical and empirical research in international relations. The argument made further 
by Haus, is that in the study of eighty wars that took place between 1945 and 1995, only 
twenty-eight involved two or more states and their armies against each other. These 
conflicts have taken place in the poorest states and impacted negatively on the millions 
of people who have been struggling to survive even before the wars started. This type 
of conflict is the reflection of what happened in Lesotho in 1998. Lesotho has a small 
population compared to its neighbour South Africa, but its conflict impacted so much 
on South Africa and Botswana, who on behalf of the SADC had to intervene through 
their armies. The intervention by those two countries had serious financial and human 
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resources implications for the two governments and the country at large (Hauss, 2001, 
P18). 
  
2.16 The root causes of Conflict 
Akokpari (2008:88) argues that Africa’s conflicts are unique in the sense that most are 
intra-state, and that some of those conflicts are caused by political and governance-
related issues. In addition to these facts, when the state fails to manage the distribution 
of resources that leads to certain constituents being favoured over others, it results in 
conflicts. Akokpari argues further that Africa’s conflicts have lately emerged to be over 
natural resources to an extent that some countries have used mineral resources to 
finance war machines, such as the diamond conflicts in Sierra Leone. It is noted that to 
a certain extent, Africa’s conflict has generally caused destruction to properties and 
human lives and also affected the institution of governance. In this study, it is the same 
pattern, as the conflict in Lesotho led to some destruction of properties, loss of human 
lives and effects on the government in dealing with such conflicts. In some countries, 
these conflicts have resulted in systematic rapes, amputations, displacements of 
communities and persistent use of child soldiers that is considered to be the defining 
characteristics of African conflict (Akokpari, 1998: P89).  
 
While conflict ranges from domestic, regional, to international level, in most African 
states that were ravaged by wars, conflict was promoted by neighbouring states who 
supported either the rebels, armed forces, or the governing regime.  Deng (1991) agrees 
that in some instances, particularly in Africa, the real causes of conflict may be traced 
from the shortage of economic resources, political power-sharing and ethnic 
differences. Another cause of conflict, in Deng’s opinion, is the interference in 
neighbours’ political situation, such that interference by the neighbouring state comes 
as a result of political belief which makes the other state defend itself beyond its 
borders. In this instance. the assistance given to South African political organisations 
(called ‘rebels’ or ‘terrorists’ by the policy makers of the day) by the governments of 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia and  (Tayime, 2008) Mozambique during apartheid times 
was justified as there was gross human violation which affected the SADC region and 




It is acknowledged that in Africa, some causes of war were externally influenced by 
international actors such as those from Europe, America, Cuba and Russia.   The role 
of these international actors in conflict was to supply the ammunition in the hands of 
the guerrillas and governments. Russia and China are seen to be the main players in the 
arms embargo situations (Laremont, 2002: P14). 
 
The pattern of the system of government as shaped by colonial masters has created 
divisions amongst nations. The tribes were divided by the newly created borders that 
led to nations starting to consider themselves as two different nations. As the state failed 
to distribute the resources impartially to its competing constituencies, it resulted in 
conflict as the constituencies started fighting for political positions, knowing that it was 
the only way to access resources (Akokpari, 1998: P89-91). 
 In some instances, the cause of conflict is due to differences in ideology and points of 
principle. A typical example is that of the apartheid era where some countries kept their 
diplomatic relations with the former South African government as they were dependent 
on it for economic reasons, despite the decision that all African countries should isolate 
South Africa at that time. (Ngomba, 2008).  
 
The question still to be answered is why these wars still take place and what the root 
causes of such conflicts are. Some exponents, such as Deng (1991) raised the issues of 
pluralism, ethnicity, and militarisation. If ethnicity and race differences were the causes 
of war, why have the conflicts started only now, if these nations and groups have been 
together for such a long time? What makes them realise only now that they are different 
from one another? It is, however, clear that unauthentic and multi-ethnic groupings have 
been the disorderly results of the colonialism which created divisions amongst nations 
and states. African states under the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) agreed to the 
colonial borders instead of concentrating on nation building, and all these led to some 
contribution to violence and wars (Deng, 1991).  
 
There has been much discussion about the conflict in Lesotho dating back as early as 
in the 1990s. The political unrest in Lesotho has mostly taken place just after elections. 
In Matlosa’s view, (2007) the conflict in Lesotho is more of a problem of factionalism 
despite that Lesotho does not have deep racial, ethnic and tribal cleavages as many 
SADC and African countries do. Therefore, the course of conflict in such a country 
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without ethnicity differences cannot be regarded to be the cause of their internal conflict 
as they are one dominant ethnic group, and therefore their conflict could lean more 
towards political power in order to have access to the scarce resources and distribution 
thereof. Other exponents on conflict refer to it as organised violence that takes various 
forms, such as gang wars, intercommunal wars, civil wars, wars of secession, and wars 
of national liberation as well as interstate wars, such forms of conflict are different and 
their causes are also analytically distinct (Cashman, 2000, P18-22). 
 
The causes of the Lesotho conflict seem to revolve around political differences, 
distribution of resources, and a political party support base which results in the 
legitimacy of government. In 1998 the conflict occurred due to rejection of election 
results as well as the breakaway by members of the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP), 
who then formed the Lesotho Congress of Democracy (LCD) Party. It has also been 
realised that due to the involvement of the army in supporting the BCP, democracy 
principles in Lesotho were compromised (Lambrechts, 1999, P21). 
 
2.17 Conflict Resolution 
According to Mandaza (1996), conflict resolution is a process by which the parties to a 
conflict voluntarily and formally agree to either dissolve the incompatibility or live with 
it without resorting to armed violence. In this study, the focus is to make an analysis 
based on the available information on how the SADC resolved the Lesotho conflict of 
1998, and whether it resorted to armed force or it was through negotiations that the 
conflict was settled (Mandaza, 1996: P3). 
Fisher (1997) defines conflict resolution by stating that it is small group discussion 
methods that bring in alternative directions towards managing conflict and the 
resolution thereof. The scholars who followed these methods of smaller group 
discussions for resolving protracted international conflict are considered as “third party 
consultation” which developed into the so-called “interactive conflict resolution” 
(ICR). Such constructive and effective face-to-face interactions amongst 
representatives of the parties themselves is a requirement to understand and resolve 
complex intercommunal and international conflicts (Fisher, 1997: P142-143). 
 
A similar assumption of interactive conflict resolution (ICR) is by Ellis (2001), who 
argues that constructive analysis and creative problem solving between antagonists can 
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be effectively employed through use of a skilled and knowledgeable third party. He 
argues that most of the African countries have, after independence, been characterised 
by engaging in war once the resources become scarce. As the expectations for 
transformation and growth tend not to be sustainable for the next generations, in most 
cases such frustrations degenerate into war. The study on the Lesotho conflict of 1998 
is an example of the situation in which the government institutions of Lesotho and the 
SADC as a regional organisation failed to apply ICR. If the skilled and knowledgeable 
third parties on dealing with conflict were engaged immediately after the indication that 
the election results were disputed, the conflict of 1998 could have been avoided (Ellis, 
2001). 
 
According to Avruch (2000), conflict is an aspect of social relationships which is a 
feature of human societies. The scarcity of resources and struggle for power as well as 
the struggle over values, are considered to be causes of conflict within certain societies. 
The second idea to that is the conflict caused by the perception and belief that current 
aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously. These two ideas suggest that conflict 
may lead to a struggle or violence, while the second one may create space for 
negotiations (Avruch, 2000). 
 
2.18 Conflict Management and Resolution 
Conflict defines the human interaction where there are decisions to be taken, mostly 
compounded by many actors. The choice to be made where there is more than one actor 
would be to satisfy or resolve the differences by negotiating or forcing the other party 
to succumb to a particular decision. Conflict occurs where there are goals to be 
achieved, but by different groups or individuals who will benefit on the outcomes of 
such choices to be made (Deng, 1991). 
 
Deng (1991) argues further that conflict may be prevented in certain instances and 
managed in some cases, but resolved if the term means the satisfaction of the demands 
rather than the eradication of underlying sentiments, or memories.  In the case of 
Lesotho, the conflict to be settled was mainly to ensure peace, and a government that 
would be accepted by people through the consent of the political parties that contested 




2.19 The Role Players in Conflict Management 
2.19.1 The state  
The state is seen as a neutral institution in resolving conflict; however, it cannot be 
separated from a person-to-person relationship in conflict behavioural patterns. When 
conflict is between two states, the Heads of State are much involved in trying to come 
up with the solution. The state has a central role to play when it comes to conflict 
resolution, as it is the only organ that has legitimate authority to use arms in resolving 
the violence. The state has fiscal monopoly over collection of taxes and tariffs. In the 
case of the Lesotho conflict, it is the King who has the constitutional powers to calm 
the political parties and can also remove the sitting government (Wallensteen, 2015, 
P158). 
 
The state has legitimate authority over its borders as its geographical territory. The 
neighbouring nations expect each state to take control over its territories, including the 
border areas. In the case of Lesotho, it is more complicated as its borders are totally 
engulfed in South African borders. The state’s role in conflict resolution will also be 
determined by how powerful its armies are, that on its own attracts interests from 
various groups who would want to be in power so that they would be in control. When 
a state is weak in controlling violence or conflict, it impacts negatively on its 
neighbours, thereby facing sanctions or interventions. In the case of the Lesotho 
conflicts, the SADC community had to intervene, especially South Africa, which was 
directly affected (Wallensteen, 2015, 161). 
 
According to Ramsbotham et al. (2006), the state remains the primary locus of identity 
for most people, and given the juridical monopoly on sovereignty still formally 
accorded to state within the current international system, all parties are still driven to 
compete for state control if they are to bring about revolutionary programmes 
(Ramsbotham et al., 2006: P101). 
 
2.19.2 The government  
The government is one of the major role players in conflict resolution, as realized in the 
case of Lesotho. The government has the responsibility to protect its citizens and the 
state properties from any kind of violence or vandalism. It is also the role of government 
to keep peace and ensure the safety of civilians. The government makes rules, 
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regulations and policies that gives guidelines on how to manage and resolve conflicts.  
When the Lesotho conflicts broke out, the Prime Minister, Phakalitha Mosisili, 
immediately called a cabinet meeting at his Maseru residence to discuss the 
deteriorating situation in the country and the mutiny of his armed forces. On the other 
hand, the reaction by the South African and the Botswana governments resemble the 
role played by government on conflict resolution because it was the key stakeholder. 
According to Wallensteen (2012), when conflict breaks out in one state and affects the 
neighbours negatively, it may face sanctions or intervention. In the case on Lesotho, it 
was the Botswana and South African governments that intervened in the conflict going 
on in Lesotho because they were the neighbors who would be affected negatively. It is 
perceived that as the government has political and military powers, it has the muscle to 
manage and resolve conflict peacefully through engaging key stakeholders. The 
government has the responsibility to bring peace and stability during the conflict 
through negotiations with the affected parties. If the differing parties are not cooperating 
with the government to resolve such conflict through negotiations, the government may 
use force, especially where the lives of civilians are threatened. The government may 
also use force in cases where the state properties or businesses are damaged through 
violent activities such as those in Maseru in 1998. The government may call for 
assistance from regional or international organisations to bring about peace and stability 
within its territories if it cannot be dealt with by its own forces or when the forces are 


















THE NORMATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF SADC’S 
PEACE AND SECURITY  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is to give an overview of the SADC organisation, its 
institutions, objectives and roles on peace and security within the region. The study 
provides the role played by SADC in the Lesotho conflict of 1998. In this context, the 
discussion also reflects the role players within the SADC region who participated or got 
involved in the Lesotho conflict of 1998 and the intervention by military forces, 
especially the South African Defence Force (SANDF), Botswana Defence Force (BDF) 
and the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF). 
 
3.2 Historical background of the SADC 
In order to understand the role of the SADC in resolving conflicts in the region, such as 
the Lesotho conflict 1998, it is critical first to provide the historical background on the 
formation of the SADC and the reasons behind its establishment.  According to 
Oosthuizen (2006), SADC was formed with the aim to get rid of the colonial powers 
and white minority regimes. These efforts started as early as the 1960s, when 
governments in the region focused on security and political cooperation. Lesotho was 
once a British colony, and therefore it has gone through some conflict resolution to 
obtain independent and freedom (Oosthuizen, 2006: P53). 
 
Buthelezi (2006) provides some background on the establishment processes of the 
SADC, starting from the first Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC) that was held in 1979 and attended by representatives from the donor 
governments and international agencies and delegates from Angola, Botswana, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia.  In 1980, a second regional economic summit was 
held in Lusaka, Zambia, resulting in the approval of the Lusaka Declaration, a statement 





In January 1992, the SADCC meeting decided to include other countries such as 
Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and Swaziland, which led to the establishment of a fully 
integrated economic community, resulting in the signing of the treaty that transformed 
into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) during the meeting held 
in Windhoek, Namibia on 17 August 1992. It is noted that during the conference held 
in Lusaka, Zambia, the main aim was to sanction South Africa so that member states 
should not continue to be dependent on South Africa’s rail and air links, port facilities, 
imports of raw materials and manufactured goods, and the supply of electric power. 
The plan did not work, as in 1995 the region realised that they were still dependent on 
South Africa for its trade outlets. (Buthelezi, 2006). 
 
Firstly, when the SADC was established, the focus was on growing economy by 
creating interdependence between nations. The second idea for establishing the SADC 
was aimed at building an organisation that would have the capacity to resolve disputes 
or conflicts and build international legal regimes. In this case, this study focuses on the 
efforts made by the SADC to resolve the Lesotho conflict of 1998. Thirdly, the 
formation of the SADC was also aimed at creating supra-national market rules that 
replace national regulatory regimes; the creation of the Southern African Community 
Union (SACU) was based on this theory. The thesis further discusses the weaknesses 
and strengths of this theory and also looks at the challenges thereof on conflict 
resolution as well as how the critics of this theory argue about it. 
 
3.3 Objectives of SADC 
The objectives of the SADC, as stated in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty (1992), are 
to achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the 
standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially 
disadvantaged through Regional Integration; and to evolve common political values, 
systems and institutions. These objectives are to be achieved through increased 
regional integration, built on democratic principles, and equitable and sustainable 
development. The objectives are, therefore, to be implemented through various 
institutions as mandated by different legal instruments such as the SADC Treaty and 
specific Protocols.  It is interesting, therefore, to note that these institutions have 
played a particular role in conflict resolution, referring specifically r to the Lesotho 




3.4 SADC Institutions 
The transformation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC) into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has records of 
remarkable achievements; however, some challenges were also encountered as a result 
of shortfalls in the existing structure. One major challenge was the establishment of an 
appropriate and effective institutional framework and structure for executing the 
organization’s new mandate. 
 
3.4.1 SADC Tribunal 
The SADC Tribunal ensures adherence to, and proper interpretation of the provisions 
of the SADC Treaty and subsidiary instruments, and adjudicates upon disputes referred 
to it. It was established by the Protocol on the Tribunal, which was signed in Windhoek, 
Namibia during the 2000 Ordinary Summit, and was officially established on 18 August 
2005 in Gaborone, Botswana. The inauguration of the Tribunal and the swearing in of 
members took place on 18 November 2005 in Windhoek, Namibia where it is based. It 
consists of appointed judges from Member States (SADC Report 2001). 
 
3.4.2 SADC Council of Ministers 
The SADC Council of Ministers is the second-tier level of the Organ comprising 
Ministers from the SADC member states, usually from the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, Economic Planning, or Finance, and they meet twice in a year preceding the 
SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government. The Council of Ministers prepare 
the Agenda for the Summit; this shows that they are also role players in conflict 
resolution. The interest on this study is to examine the role played by the Council of 
Ministers during the Lesotho conflict of 1998.  
 
According to Likoti (2007), it is unclear if there was a formal SADC decision on the 
intervention in the Lesotho conflict of 1998; he points out that political commentators 
gave different opinions in trying to justify or repudiate the intervention. The argument 
raised by Likoti (2007) on the role of SADC’s OPDS in intrastate conflict is that the 
decision seems to have been taken at a ministerial meeting attended by Botswana and 
South Africa only. The paper refers to the minutes of the meeting held in Gaborone on 
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15 September 1998 while it is still not clear if the SADC Summit took a decision on 
this matter in Mauritius (Likoti, 2007: P255). 
 
3.4.3 Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committees 
The Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committees consist of ministers from each 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Member State. These committees 
are directly responsible for overseeing the activities of the core areas of integration, 
monitoring and controlling the implementation of the Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan in their area of competence, as well as providing policy advice to 
the Council. Currently the Cluster Committees comprise the following: 
• Ministers responsible for Trade, Industry, Energy, Tourism, Finance and 
Investment; 
• Ministers responsible for Infrastructure and Services; 
• Ministers responsible for Food, Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment; 
• Ministers responsible for Social and Human Development and Special 
Programmes (HIV and AIDS; education, labour; employment and gender); 
• Ministers responsible for Politics, Defence and Security; and 
• Ministers responsible for Legal Affairs and Judicial matters 
 
3.4.4 Organ on Politics, Defence Security and Cooperation (OPDSC) 
The outcomes of the Heads of States and governments during their meeting held in 
Windhoek, Namibia, in 1992, was the signing of the Declaration and SADC Treaty that 
also resulted in the change of name and the emphasis shifting from development 
coordination to development integration, hence this study on regionalism conflict 
resolution in Southern Africa (de Coning, 2003: P54). 
 
OPDSC is the defence, security and peace committee of the SADC that is responsible 
for the development and implementation of the strategies to deal with conflict and 
security matters in the SADC region. It is the main role player on conflict resolution. 
and the study will, therefore, focus on the interventions proposed and implemented on 
the Lesotho conflict of 1998. The study will also, to a certain extent, show how the 





3.5 Objectives of the OPDSC 
The establishment of the OPDSC was discussed and recommended to the Heads of State 
by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security in a meeting held in Gaborone 
on 16 January 1996, and approved by the Heads of State, i.e. the SADC Summit on 
June 1996. The objectives of the OPDSC are, among others, to prevent conflict in the 
region by establishing security and defence cooperation. The OPDSC also ensures there 
is development of collective security capacity as well as the defence pact and the 
regional peacekeeping capacity. In strengthening regional integration, the OPDSC is 
also tasked with the responsibility of coordinating participation by member states in an 
international and regional peace-keeping capacity. The mediation and dispute 
resolution as well as sustainable peace through peace-making and peace-keeping are 
among the objectives to be fulfilled by the OPDSC. In addressing extra-regional 
conflicts which impact on peace and security in Southern Africa, the OPDSC would 
apply preventive diplomacy and mechanisms, with punitive measures as the last resort 
(Likoti, 2007: P254-255). 
 
The Defence Pact requires member states to individually train, develop capacity within 
their military, police and defense structures with the aim to jointly capacitate the region 
for the reposes of security and peace-keeping missions with respect to defence 
cooperation, jointly train military personnel, hold military exercises and exchange 
military intelligence and information (Oosthuizen, (2006: 296).  
In this study, the focus is to analyse the role of the OPDSC in resolving the Lesotho 
conflict of 1998, that is to try and find out whether the interventions came as a result of 
the collective peace-keeping move as sanctioned by the OPDSC or it was individual 
states’ security units that were used to protect individual member states.  
 
3.6 The Summit  
The Summit comprises Heads of State or Government from the sixteen (16) member 
states and is managed on a Troika system. The Summit usually meets once a year 
around August/September in a member State, at which a new Chairperson and Deputy 
are elected and both the Chair and Deputy Chair co-chair the Summit meetings. 
 
The SADC Summit is the highest body responsible for the overall policy direction and 
control of functions of the community, ultimately making it the policy-making 
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institution. The Summit, as the supreme policy-making organ of the SADC is 
responsible for the appointment of the Executive Secretary. The study will therefore 
examine the role of the Summit in decision making regarding conflict resolution in the 
region, with particular reference to the Lesotho conflict of 1998. On 14 September 
1998, President Nelson Mandela of South Africa, in his closing remarks at the Summit 
of Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Community 
at Grand Baie, Mauritius, said:  
“The culture of democracy that has taken root in our region is on a forward march and 
there is no going back. As SADC, we pledge our unwavering support and assistance to 
those countries still grappling with democratic and constitutional reforms, with 
restoring peace or the conditions for democratic elections. SADC stands ready to 
continue its efforts to facilitate a resolution of the problems that have arisen in Lesotho 
concerning the results of the elections. Our confidence that the leaders of Lesotho will 
find a satisfactory solution is strengthened by their response to the mediation initiative 
taken by the SADC foursome consisting of Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and 
South Africa”.  
 
3.7 Troika 
The Troika is composed of the current SADC Chairperson, the incoming Chairperson 
(the Deputy Chairperson at the time), and the immediate previous Chairperson. The 
Troika system vests authority in this group to take quick decisions on behalf of SADC 
that are ordinarily taken at policy meetings scheduled at regular intervals, as well as 
providing policy direction to SADC institutions between regular SADC Summits. This 
system has been effective since it was established by the Summit at its annual meeting 
in Maputo, Mozambique, in August 1999. Other member States may be co-opted into 
the Troika as and when necessary. The Troika system operates at the level of the 
Summit, the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS), the Council of Ministers 
and the Standing Committee of Senior Officials. Application of two Troikas at the level 
of the Standing Committee of Senior Officials, which comprises Permanent or Principal 
Secretaries or accounting for government offices, ministries or departments and at the 





3.8 Summit Troika of the Organ 
The SADC OPDS is managed on a Troika basis and is responsible for promoting peace 
and security in the SADC region. It is mandated to steer and provide Member states 
with direction regarding matters that threaten peace, security and stability in the region. 
It is coordinated at the level of Summit, consisting of a Chairperson, Incoming 
Chairperson and Outgoing Chairperson, and reports to the SADC Summit Chairperson. 
The SADC Summit and Organ Troika Summit are mutually exclusive, and the 
Chairperson of the Organ does not simultaneously hold the Chair of the Summit. The 
Organ structure, operations and functions are regulated by the Protocol on Politics, 
Defence and Security Cooperation. Like the Summit chair, the Organ chair rotates on 
an annual basis (SADC Report 2001). 
 
 
3.9 Conflict management  
The Defence Pact and the protocol OPDSC deals with the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts as those are the key responsibilities of the SADC Summit and 
the Secretariat.  The SADC established the OPDSC and the regular meetings by Heads 
of State, Senior officials builds into the trust and creating confidence to the community 
as far as the conflict management and resolution are concerned. The interesting part is 
to identify how these systems fit into the AU and UN peace and security systems when 
it comes to conflict prevention, management and resolution (Oosthuizen, 2006:285). 
 
According to the international law and the UN Charter, it is stipulated that state parties 
to the OPDSC protocol and Defence Pact should settle their disputes peacefully and 
may not use threat or force against each other or against other states, but must respect 
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each other and also not to interfere in each 
other state’s internal affairs. This requirement seems to have been partially observed by 
the SADC when dealing with the Lesotho conflict of 1998 (Oosthuizen, 2006: P286). 
 
 
3.10 Peace operations in SADC 
One of the objectives of the SADC Organ is peace-keeping in the region, which has 
three elements. The first one is that there should be peace, secondly that peacekeeping 
should take place with the consent of all involved parties, and thirdly that no force 
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should be used to keep such peace. The pact further elaborates that the peaceful means 
in resolving conflicts is not meant to support any efforts by persons or organs that are 
destabilising the defence or military territorially, economically or in social security 
including the acts aimed at changing the constitution or constitutional order of a state 
in an unconstitutional means. In terms of the pact, the Summit is expected to resolve 
intra-state and interstate conflicts in a peaceful manner, through negations, preventive 
diplomacy, conciliation and mediation processes. Oosthuizen (2006) further alludes to 
the fact that the Summit is the only body mandated to take decisions regarding the 
enforcement action against a disputed party in line with the OPDSC recommendations 
(Oosthuizen, 2006: P288) 
 
 
3.11 SADC Election guidelines 
One of the challenges considered as a gap on the role of SADC organisation in 
managing peace and security at the time of Lesotho conflict 1998 is the lack of 
formalised election guidelines as a tool for manging conflict amongst the member 
states. It is clear that election guidelines were not formalised at that time. According to 
Oosthuizen (2006), the SADC election guidelines for running and managing election 
outcomes in cases of disputes were developed without following the set-up procedures 
as they were not thoroughly consulted with key stakeholders. This is substantiated by 
the statement that the guidelines were secretly drafted and not subjected to legal scrutiny 
by the Legal Services within the SADC Secretariat. The guidelines were only adopted 
by the SADC Summit in 2004. The aim of the Summit to have the election guidelines 
was to enhance the transparency, credibility of elections and democratic governance 
and to ensure that the outcomes of the elections are acceptable to all contesting parties. 
These guidelines were formally informed by the SADC Treaty, the OPDSC Protocol, 
the SIPO and the major principles and guidelines extracted from the OAU Declaration 
on the Principles governing Democratic Elections in Africa (AU election declarations) 
and the AU Guidelines for African Union Electoral Observation and Monitoring 
Missions. When the Lesotho election resulted were announced. In this case it can be 
concluded that SADC did not have any formal processes or guidelines to deal with 





It can be argued that if the guidelines were adopted prior to Lesotho conflict 1998, it 
would have been an instrument for SADC to manage the riots in Lesotho. The 
guidelines requires member states to adhere to principles such as freedom of 
association, political tolerance, equal opportunity for all political parties to access state 
media, equal opportunity to vote and be voted for, the independence of the judiciary 
and the impartiality of the electoral institutions, acceptance and respect by political 
parties of the election results as proclaimed to be free and fair by the competent National 
Electoral Authorities in accordance with the law of the country. The guidelines further 
make provision for the challenging of election results which should be followed in 
accordance with the domestic law and regular intervals for elections in line with the 
constitution of the land. The election guidelines somehow convincingly reflect the 
efforts by SADC to ensure that future elections and outcomes thereof will be managed 
better to minimise the disputes and conflicts. (Oosthuizen, 2006: P304).  
 
 
3.12 Role Players in Lesotho Conflict 1998 
Politics of Lesotho takes place in a framework of a parliamentary-representative 
democratic constitutional monarchy, whereby the Prime Minister of Lesotho is the head 
of government, and of a multi-party system. The Executive power is exercised by the 
government and the legislative power is vested in both the government and the two 
chambers of Parliament, that is the Senate and the National Assembly. The Judiciary is 
independent of the Executive and the Legislature (Euromonitor Report, 2012). 
 
Figure 1. 
Map of the geographical position of Lesotho 
 
Figure 1 shows the geographical position of Lesotho which is inside the borders of 
South Africa.  It can therefore, be noted that political instability in Lesotho impact 




Country Map of Lesotho 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the Lesotho districts, with Maseru as the highly populated one 
where most of violent activities took place during the 1998 conflict.  
 
 
Figure 3: Country Flag  
 
Figure 3 is the flag of Lesotho which is the national symbol of the government of 
Lesotho. 
 
 3.13 The Government of Lesotho 
 13.1 The Executive  
The Lesotho Government is a modified form of a constitutional monarchy. The 
Prime Minister is head of government and has executive authority. The King serves 
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largely a ceremonial function, as he no longer possesses any executive authority 
and is prohibited from actively participating in political initiatives. According to 
the Lesotho constitution, the leader of the majority party in the Assembly 
automatically becomes Prime Minister; the monarchy is hereditary, but, under the 
terms of the Constitution which came into effect after the March 1993 election, the 
monarch is a "living symbol of national unity" with no executive or legislative 
powers. Under traditional law, the College of Chiefs has the power to determine 
who is next in the line of succession, to serve as regent in the event that the 
successor is not of mature age, and may even depose the monarch (Euromonitor 
Report, 2012). 
 
3.13.2 The Legislative 
The Legislative branch, which is the bicameral Parliament, consists of the Senate 
(33 members: 22 principal chiefs and 11 other members appointed by the ruling 
party) and the Assembly (120 seats, 80 by popular vote and 40 by proportional 
vote; members elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms ((Euromonitor 
Report, 2012). 
 
 3.13.3 The Judicial 
The judicial is composed of the High Court, Court of Appeal; Magistrates’ Courts 
and customary or traditional courts. The High Court’s Chief Justice is appointed 
by the monarch acting on the advice of the Prime Minister (Euromonitor Report, 
2012). 
 
3.14 Political Overview 
Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy. The King is the head of state, and executive 
powers are vested in an elected Prime Minister. Lesotho politics used to be 
dominated by two major parties. The Basotho National Party (BNP), which ruled 
the country from 1965 until 1986; and the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), which 
governed the country from 1993 until a breakaway faction, the Lesotho Congress 
for Democracy (LCD), won the 1998 elections (Likoti, 2007: P252-253). 
Matlosa, (1999) in his abstract, argues that the Lesotho government is a key role 
player in the Lesotho conflict of 1998. The BCP, which was the government before 
elections, having lost on elections, could not take the loss and thereby declared that 
38 
 
the elections were not fair and free. On the other hand, the winning LCD also called 
on the neighbouring states to intervene through the use of military forces. 
Furthermore, the non-inclusion of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) into the 
Lesotho Defence Force during the 1993 political transition was like a time-bomb 
waiting to be detonated (Matlosa, 1999). 
 
The challenge raised by some analysts of the Lesotho conflict is that the Prime 
Minister, when requesting military intervention, did not consult the King as one 
with the monarchy’s powers and authority to declare the situation. It is noted, as 
Likoti reflects, that on the other hand, the ruling party suspected that the King was 
on the side of the protesters, since he had refused that the army remove them from 
the palace gates (Likoti, 2007: P274). 
 
 
3.15 Lesotho Political Parties 
The main political party role players for the 1998 elections were the BCP and the 
LCD, as well as the MFP and the BNP. The split of the BNC as the ruling party 
leading to the establishment of the LCD led by the leader of the former BNC, 
former Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle, created rivalry between the two parties at 
the political platform. Lesotho being such a small country, one of the challenges 
was on how to contest elections with many political parties as seen in 1998 (Likoti, 
2007, P275). 
 
According to Milazi (1991), Lesotho’s political problems started as early as in the 
sixties after the country gaining their freedom. This was under the LCD as ruling 
regime, as they continuously manipulated the electoral process. The LCD won a 
landslide victory in the 1993 elections and have been lobbying the leadership of 
the SADC region states to support them to stay in power.  
 
3.16 Civil Society 
The civil society of Lesotho played a role during the conflicts of 1998 as they 
heeded the call by the opposition parties and exerted pressure by gathering at the 
grounds at the Royal Palace and making their voices heard regarding their 
dissatisfaction at the manner in which the elections were conducted. There were 
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lootings and burning of businesses and government properties as the people of 
Lesotho demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the election results. The Civil 
Society Organisations between Lesotho and South Africa play a greater role in the 
politics of Lesotho and therefore cannot be left out in planning stages and crises in 
resolution of conflict such as that of 1998 (Lambrechts, 1999: P38).  
 
According to Matlosa (1999), a weak and disjointed civil society and lack of local 
conflict management mechanisms is considered to be one of the factors that caused 
the Lesotho conflict 1998. The communities play a role in conflict resolution as 
they are the ones who give the political parties the mandate through their votes. 
When the outcomes of the elections are disputed, the leadership of such political 
parties also listen to the voice of the masses that voted for them. As the election 
results were disputed, the Basotho (community members) were involved in the 
conflict in 1998 whereby government properties were vandalized, shops looted, 
schools boycotted, civil servants not going to work, etc. The Sunday Independent 
reported that the SANDF had to intervene in order to disperse mobs and stop the 
unrest that was going on, especially in Maseru (Likoti, 2007). 
 
3.17 Media 
The media are one of the role players when it comes to conflict resolution which 
can either positively or negatively influence the reaction of impacted 
constituencies. As most media may be independent, and few are state controlled, 
the challenge then, is who is reaching and convincing the majority depending on 
the manner in which they spread their information or news. During the 1998 
Lesotho conflict, the Mail and Guardian was one of the media platforms that 
reported on the events. According to the report by Shaba Ka ‘Nkosi (Mail & 
Guardian , 25 September 1998), the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) soldiers who  
sympathised with the opposition parties, removed arms from the military bases in 
preparation for the prolonged war against the allied forces of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC).  
 
The Basotho soldiers retreated strategically to the mountains to defend their 
Makonyane headquarters not to fall in the hands of the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF) and the Botswana Defence Force (BDF). The SANDF 
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and the BDF tried to stamp their authority on the mountain kingdom, forcing the 
LDF troops out of their barracks, but because they perceived the war as foreign 
invasion, the soldiers started regrouping themselves. The Mail & Guardian 
reported further that the civilians were brandishing rifles in the streets, besides the 
heavy contingent of armed troops of the SADC. The newspaper reported that one 
of the LDF lieutenants, who refused to disclose his name, told the Mail & Guardian 
that most of his colleagues were prepared for the guerilla warfare, should all their 
bases fall under the SADC. (Shaba Ka ‘Nkosi, Mail & Guardian newspaper, 25 
September, 1998) 
 
According to Likoti (2007: 253), as the media were handled by SANDF rather than 
by the SADC officers, and the intervention forces were visited by the South African 
Minister and the Chief of Defence Force, this painted a picture for the media which 
concluded that the reporting chain was through the South African channels.  
Outside the borders of Lesotho, the South African newspaper, The Sunday 
Independent, of February, 1999 gave a complicated story about the intervention by 
reporting that the two South African helicopters opened fire on the sleeping 
soldiers, and thereafter special forces were landed, proceeding to kill any LDF 
survivors. Another report stated that the SANDF bayoneted the corpses and blasted 
their heads with bullets, and then moved to Maseru to deal with the unrest that was 
taking place there. The reporting of the two newspapers seems to suggest that the 
South African soldiers were mercilessly killing the Lesotho soldiers who were not 
even fighting. The LDF forces were actually fighting back to an extent that they 
killed some of the SADC soldiers. As the lieutenant expressed the LDF’s position, 
that they were going to fight and that they had more ammunitions, which the SADC 
troops undermined, that was realized when the SADC troops suffered casualties 












THE ROLE OF SADC IN LESOTHO CONFLICT 1998  
 
4.1 Introduction 
SADC as a regional organisations has a responsibility in driving regional integration 
for economic growth and ensuring that there is political stability in the region. Political 
instability and conflicts have a negative impact on SADC’s Programmes as some are 
threat to the peace and security of the region. In 1998, when the elections were held, 
they were conducted amidst tensions and animosity due to the earlier division of the 
Basotholand Congress Party (BCP) which resulted in the establishment of the Lesotho 
Congress for Democracy (LCD). The split of the BCP was led by its founder, Ntsu 
Mokhehle, who by then was the Prime Minister of Lesotho. The election results brought 
shock to many as the LCD which had been formed a few months before elections, were 
announced as the winners of the 1998 elections. The opposition parties formed 
alliances, started street protests, and went to the High Court for the election results to 
be nullified and for the dismissal of the government. However, such a move was never 
supported by the High Court which indicated that constitutionally it is only the King 
who can dissolve the sitting government (Southall, 2008: P69). 
 
Subsequent to the court ruling, the protesters sought permission from the police in order 
to lead a march to the King’s Palace that took place on 4 August 1998. The aim for the 
march was to petition the King that through his constitutional powers, he should 
dissolve the sitting government and establish a government of national unity as the 
election results were disputed. While the opposition parties were gathered at the 
Kingdom Palace gate, local efforts to bring the disputing parties to a negotiating table 
were initiated leading to the establishment of a Lesotho Crisis Committee. The Crisis 
Committee was comprised of the Lesotho Chamber of commerce and Industry (LCCI), 
Lesotho Council of Non-Government Organisations (LCN) and Lesotho Network of 
Conflict Management (LNCM). However, the Crisis Committee’s efforts were 
shuttered down as the government of the day viewed the committee with suspicion. The 
opposition parties were optimistic and showed that by participating in some meetings 
of the crisis committee, but the ruling party did not allow home ground negotiated 
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settlement. As the attempt to facilitate negotiations by the Crisis committee failed, that 
paved the way for diplomatic settlement through mediation. (Lambrechts, 1999. P6-7). 
 
 
4.2 SADC’s intervention on Lesotho conflict of 1998  
It is clear from the above that the government of Lesotho and the opposition parties 
came to an agreement to then settle their differences through mediation and thereby 
requesting the South African government as mediator. The South African government 
mandated the then Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, to mediate. On 10th August, after a 
long week when the opposition parties had been at the palace gate waiting for the reply 
from His Majesty the King, a delegation from South Africa led by Thabo Mbeki 
accompanied by Minister of Defence Joe Modise and Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred 
Nzo arrived in Maseru to talk to the leaders of the government and the opposition 
parties. It was during the meeting between South African delegation and the Lesotho 
parties that an agreement was reached to launch a SADC Election Auditing Initiative 
leading to the establishment of the Langa Commission to investigate the legitimacy of 
the election results and the veracity of the claims by the opposition parties. (Likoti, 
2007: P251). 
 
Following the agreement for mediation, Deputy President Mbeki established a 
Commission of Enquiry led by the Judge of the South African High Court, Justice Pius 
Langa. The commission was composed of representatives from Botswana, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe, with no representatives from Lesotho. The Langa Commission started 
work on 14 August 1998 with the mandate to investigate claims by the opposition 
parties that the election was rigged. It is noted that the Langa report could not be 
communicated as early as anticipated, the political tempers were rising that resulted in 
the loss of some life. (Lambrechts, 1999. P8-9) 
 
It was only on 17 September 1998 that the Pius Langa report was presented to the Heads 
of the SADC Summit in Mauritius which created further anxiety on the Basotho side. 
The report did not confirm nor disapprove the allegations that the election was rigged. 
Both the opposition and the ruling parties found ground to stamp their position as the 




What also created more doubts to the citizens’ minds was the unclear statements such 
as the announcement on Lesotho Radio on 26 August 1998 that “98 per cent of the 
electoral process was marked by faults and irregularities” In the same week, Ministers 
of the Lesotho government were also heard on radio, making statements that tried to 
shun away the use of the word ’fraud’ in an effort to justify the election results as free 
and fair (Southall, 2008: P69). 
 
The new party, however, failed to secure a majority to form a government, even though 
it won the most seats in parliament. Five other parties, such as the All Basotho 
Convention, LCD, BNP, and two other smaller parties, formed a coalition government, 
the first in the country’s history. The change of government is not expected to lead to 
significant changes in economic policy; however, the new government has already 
embraced the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) and has been consolidating 
programmes started by the previous government. The BCP the Basotho National Party 
(BNP) collectively declared the elections fraudulent and mobilised their supporters who 
then gathered at the grounds of the Royal Palace. According to Lambrechts (1999), in 
a few weeks the situation was starting to get out of hand as the BCP capitalised on its 
connections with the army and the youth who were roaming the country in armed bands. 
On the other hand, civil servants were prohibited from going to work and Ministers 
reported being under house arrest. On 11 September things got worse as the Chief of 
the Army, Lieutenant-General Makhula Motakeng, and a number of high-ranking 
military officers were arrested and displaced by junior officers (Lambrechts, 1999: 
P23). 
 
According to Lambrechts (1999), Lesotho has a history of political conflicts which have 
mainly revolved around the distribution of resources, political participation and 
legitimacy of government. However, it is noted that the major cause for the 1998 
conflict was triggered by the spilt of the BCOPC in 1997, leading to the establishment 
of the BCP.  The other factor that contributed to the cause of such conflict was the 
increasing competition for state resources and employment among the middle-class 
professionals and the political elite. According to other analysts of the Lesotho conflict, 
such as Likoti (2007), it can also be concluded that, due to lack of vision for shared 
power by the political parties, it had pushed the opposition parties consistently to resort 
to reversing the results of elections. It is noted that the use of the “first past the post” 
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electoral system has also contributed to conflict; and the use of the army by the BNP 
has undermined democracy which led to politicisation of state institutions (Likoti, 2007: 
P251-252) 
 
4.3 SADC’s military intervention 
When the Langa report was not issued immediately to the Basotho parties concerned, 
waiting to present it to the SADC Summit, the then Prime Minister of Lesotho, Mr 
Phakalitha Mosisili wrote to the heads of states of South Africa, Botswana, 
Mozambique, and Zimbabwe requesting assistance as the conflict was escalating. 
Botswana and South Africa responded positively to the call and sent their troops on 22 
and 23 September 1998 respectively. The plan for such assistance was not as 
anticipated, as the South African army caused more havoc, starting at the Katse Dam 
all the way to Maseru. That led to looting, burning of shops and factories, as well as 
xenophobic attacks by the armed youth (Matlosa, 1999). 
 
Merrils, (2011) purports that the role of regional organisation where necessary, will 
involve coordinating mediation by a third party instead of using the officials of such an 
institution to resolve the disputes. During the Lesotho conflict 1998, the only military 
troops that intervened were from South Africa and Botswana, but operating in the name 
of the SADC military troops, it was through that intervention that the political parties 
came together to negotiate with the South African Minister of Safety and Security for 
mediation. The settlement of such negotiations had two pillars which included holding 
of fresh elections and the establishment of the Interim Political Authority (IPA). 
(Matlosa, 1999). 
 
4.4 SANDF Military intervention 
The South African Government played a vital role in the Lesotho conflict of 1998. The 
tense relationship between the organs of government, such as the executive, monarchy 
and security establishment, necessitated the intervention of the South African 
government. The intervention by South Africa in the Lesotho conflict was somehow 
viewed as the pretext for South Africa in furthering its own interests. On the other hand, 
it was viewed as the conflict between President Mandela and President Robert Mugabe 
who were the Chair of SADC and SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
respectively. According to de Coning (1998), on 22 September 1998, the South African 
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troops got into Lesotho to prevent what was assumed to be the attempted coup. The 
South African Defence Force went in with the aim to prevent the Lesotho soldiers from 
staging a coup. The fact that there was unrest in Maseru, looting of shops, civilians 
prohibited from going to work, Ministers kept on house arrest and the high-ranking 
Military Officers being arrested and displaced, was enough to trigger the SADC Organ 
on Politics, Defence and Security’s conclusion that there was an attempted coup in 
Lesotho (de Coning, 1998: 43). 
 
Those who are not so convinced about the manner in which the South African Defence 
Force intervened in Lesotho, question the legitimacy from an international perspective 
as they do not view it to have been on humanitarian grounds. It is viewed from a realities 
perspective as South Africa is considered to have moved in fast to protect its own 
interest, the Katse Dam, which is a major water project between the two countries. 
Further criticism of this intervention is by de Coning, who argues that South Africa, 
Botswana and the SADC seem to have failed to comply in terms of Chapter VIII of the 
Charter of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, which requires them to obtain 
prior approval for such interventions. It is also argued that the intervention was 
inconsistent with Article 4 (a) of the SADC Treaty, which emphasises the principle of 
sovereign equality of all member states (de Coning, 1998: 44-46). 
 
4.5 Reasons for intervention 
Some of the reasons provided by those who studied the Lesotho conflict of 1998, such 
as Milazi (1999), argue that the intervention by the SADC in the Lesotho conflicts was 
based more on the need for regional cooperation. It is also highlighted that the speedy 
invasion by the South African military was more about protection of the Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project of which both Lesotho and South Africa are the beneficiaries.  
 
Furthermore, the allegations by the opposition parties that the elections were rigged, 
triggered the intervention by the SADC for ensuring that fair and free elections could 
be held again under safe conditions. The other reason for intervention was because the 
junior military officers displaced their higher- ranking officers and therefore, such 
actions threatened political stability in that country. The military interventions were 
heeding to the call by Prime Minister Mosisili to avoid anarchy in the deteriorating 
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democracy. The interventions as led by the South African government, saw the shift in 
the South African foreign policy from influencing negotiations on settling violence or 
conflict to military interventions. These reflect double standards, even though it might 
be argued that each case should be treated on its own merit (Milazi, 1999: P274-276). 
 
In his article on the motives for intervention, Likoti (2007) raised the question on why 
South Africa intervened within a month of intra-state conflict, while it could not act in 
the same way on the similar situation in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC). The actions of the South African government in this instance, is what 
Ramsbotham (2011) defines as motives, that by nature men will be involved or engaged 
in quarrels for the purposes of gain, keeping safety and reputation. It is clear that South 
Africa’s intervention in the Lesotho conflict was consistent with all these principles. 
This was witnessed by the protection of Katse Dam, as it is considered a precious 
resource. Though the SADC Summit nor the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
did not meet and sanction the military intervention in Lesotho conflict, Prime Minister 
Mosisili took a decisive move and requested the neighbouring states for military 
intervention. The quick response was from South Africa and Botswana, who then 
operated inconsistently with the SADC decision making rules and the UN Charter, 
making it illegal under international law. Hence Likoti’s argument that this intervention 
was driven by realist interest from the South African side (Likoti 2007: P253-254). 
 
The other justification for the interventions was also triggered by the outcomes of the 
report of the appointed Commission under the leadership of South African President 
Mbeki, chaired by Justice Pius Langa. The investigation results confirmed that there 














Findings and the empirical and theoretical significance of the study  
 
5.1 Introduction 
The focus on this chapter is to analyse the findings of the study on the role of SADC 
in conflict resolution especially in the Lesotho conflict 1998. It further reflects what 
the consequences of the actions taken by South Africa during its intervention on 
the Lesotho conflict of 1998. South Africa’s intervention and the fast move to 
protect the Katse Dam were as due to the threats by the mutineers to destroy the 
dam, South Africa would not risk losing such a precious commodity, and for 
security reasons, felt it necessary to protect the dam first before quelling the 
violence in the central districts such as in Maseru. 
 
Some of the arguments brought forward on South Africa’s actions in the Lesotho 
conflict of 1998, is the assumption that South Africa and Zimbabwe were 
competing for the leading role and also to gain reputation in the SADC region. 
Thirdly, South Africa could not relax when a state within its borders threatened its 
own security which could lead to the disorder in the peace-keeping in the region 
(Likoti, 1999: P259). 
 
According to Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, (2000), peacekeeping is not a highly 
theorised topic as most of the writing on the subject has been done by diplomats 
and military people with experience in the field. In furthering their argument, they 
refer to Diehl who wrote that, “Changes in peace keeping operations have not been 
matched by alterations in the way that scholars analyse them. The standard study 
of peace keeping remains one of a single case study, in which description is the 
primary goal. An approach based on the uniqueness of peace keeping missions does 
not assist in building a theory of peace keeping, nor does he provide much guidance 
in making policy” (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 2000. P190-193) 
 
5.2 Managing regional elections  
Though the absence of SADC’s election guidelines during the Lesotho conflict 
1998 cannot be regarded as the causal factor for such conflicts, it has rendered 
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SADC inefficient in dealing with the disputed election results. This is substantiated 
by the statement that the guidelines were secretly drafted and were not subjected to 
legal scrutiny by the Legal Services within the SADC Secretariat, and were only 
adopted by the SADC Summit in 2004. The aim of the Summit to have the election 
guidelines was to enhance the transparency and credibility of elections and 
democratic governance and to ensure that the outcomes of the elections are 
acceptable to all contesting parties.  (Oosthuizen, 2006: P304).  
 
The regional organisation may somehow be restricted from taking sanctions on a 
particular party if member states dependent on such a country for certain 
commodities or facilities. A good example of this scenario is the decision taken 
during the conference held in Lusaka, Zambia, aimed to sanction the “apartheid” 
South Africa so that member states should not continue to be dependent on South 
Africa’s rail and air links, port facilities, imports of raw materials and manufactured 
goods, and the supply of electric power. The plan did not work, as in 1995 the 
region realised that they were still dependent on South Africa for its trade outlets. 
This decision would have suffocated Lesotho which is totally engulfed in South 
African borders.  The intervention by South Africa during the Lesotho conflict 
1998 is a clear example on how a country which is politically, economically and 
defence wise is stronger than its allies could swiftly take actions without following 
all protocols and still not get sanctions by the regional organisation.  
 
According to the report by Shaba Ka ‘Nkosi (Mail & Guardian , 25 September 
1998), the Lesotho Defense Force (LDF) soldiers who sympathized with the 
opposition parties, removed arms from the military bases in preparation for the 
prolonged war against the allied forces of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). It can be argued that Media misled the masses by reporting 
that SA Defense Force was going to take over, thereby making Lesotho defense 
forces to take the arms out of military bases. The media reporting back to SA that 
military that is supporting the opposition parties who are against the election 
results, have taken the arms out of military base, thereby giving impression for a 
coup d’état, and therefore triggered SANDF to react immediately fearing for the 
safety of its security but mainly the protection of a strategic water project that the 
country have invested.  
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It is also noted that the newspaper further reported that one of the LDF lieutenants, 
who refused to disclose his name, told the Mail & Guardian that most of his 
colleagues were prepared for the guerilla warfare, should all their bases fall under 
the SADC. (Shaba Ka ‘Nkosi, Mail & Guardian newspaper, 25 September, 1998 
 
During the Lesotho conflict 1998, the only military troops that intervened were 
from South Africa and Botswana, but operating in the name of the SADC military 
troops. It was through that intervention that the political parties came together to 
negotiate with the South African Minister of Safety and Security for mediation. 
The settlement of such negotiations had two pillars which included holding fresh 
elections and the establishment of the Interim Political Authority (IPA). (Matlosa, 
1999).  
 
The intervention by South Africa does not seem to have been initiated by SADC 
as the regional organisation, but by the political parties themselves. It is therefore 
clear that the SADC has not played its part as a regional organisation in appointing 
or coordinating the establishment of a third party that would mediate between the 
disputing parties.  
 
Scholars of regionalism argue that empirical theories seek to explain why certain 
phenomena occur, and therefore, focus on cause and effect relationships. Thus, 
empirical theories of conflict resolution analyse why at some times, we can settle 
our disputes peacefully, while at others, we turn to violence and war. (Hauss, 2001: 
P13).  
 
Considering all the above facts on peace-keeping, as for the Lesotho conflict, none 
of those facts were properly applied. There had, indeed, been violence going on, 
but as to whether it warranted the intervention of the regional armed forces is 
questionable. It seems that the intervention by both South Africa and Botswana 
were for peace enforcement, which is why there was resistance. The military 
intervention by South Africa and Botswana in the Lesotho conflict has no basis or 
legal background as it is not clear if the two countries were authorised under the 
SADC Treaty or the African Unity. The due processes and procedures under SADC 
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or AU to obtain a mandate for the intervention in the Lesotho conflict were never 
duly followed or adhered to (Lambrechts, 1999). 
 
Lambrechts (1999) puts forward the idea that there are no functioning regional 
institutions to manage conflict in Southern Africa. The view by Lambrechts is 
based on the outcomes of the discussions and presentations on peace keeping in 
Southern Africa that took place four weeks after South Africa’s military 
intervention in Lesotho in September 1998.  
 
As Likoti argues (2007) the quick response operation by South Africa and 
Botswana is regarded to be inconsistence with the SADC decision making rules 
and the UN Charter, making it illegal under international law and that such an 
intervention was driven by realist interest from the South African side (Likoti 2007: 
P253-254). 
 
There are differing conclusions on the report of Pius Langa, much as the opposition 
parties could not trust the results of election, Lambrechts and Likoti purports that 
the report did not clearly confirm or disagree that the election was rigged, whereas 
Milanzi is of the view that the investigation results confirmed that there were 
indeed some irregularities during the election processes of 1998 (Milazi, 1991: 
P276-277). 
  
5.3 Implications of South Africa’s actions  
Amongst the roles of SADC’s objectives as a regional organisation, is that peace-
keeping should take place with the consent of all involved parties; in the case of 
the Lesotho conflict, this objective was never complied with, as South Africa does 
not seem to have consulted the involved parties nor seek the SADC’s approval due 
to its interest in the resources in Lesotho and for its security. It is therefore clear 
that states would not interfere or condemn any other state if it has acted in the 
interest of bringing peace and stability either through negotiations or by force. In 
this instance, it could be argued that when intervening in Lesotho conflict, South 
Africa was leaning on the SADC guidelines as outlined in the defence pact that 
compels state parties to individually and collectively maintain their individual self-
defence capacity to maintain peace, security and stability (Oosthuizen, 2006).  
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South Africa may have taken a decision that there wasn’t time and many options 
when it comes to consultation with the relevant bodies on security peace-keeping 
missions such as the SADC Summit or the SADC Organ on Peace and Security or 
the United Nations Peace-Keeping Mission. At that time, the political situation in 
Lesotho resembled a state without power to resolve its own internal challenges; 
therefore, South Africa’s intervention became necessary as the effects of such 
conflicts would impact directly and negatively on South Africa’s economy, peace 
and security. Though realists argue that domestically there are institutions that can 
help the state to survive, it can be argued at the same time that such institutions at 
times are weak or non-existence. The argument is sustained by the fact that none 
of the existing institutions such as the SADC, the African Union and the UN could 
hold the South African government accountable for its actions in the Lesotho 
conflicts (Likoti, 1999, P256). 
 
5.4 Implications for the interventions 
The report by the Mail and Guardian, 25 September - October, (1998) assumes 
that that Lesotho’s politicians are used to weak political institutions and are inter-
dependent on South Africa for economic and political support. The invasion of 
Lesotho was not well received by the Basotho as they felt that their people were 
brutalised and that there was no agreement or consent from the Head of State of 
Lesotho for South African troops that got into Lesotho masquerading as the SADC. 
The actions of the South African military troops did not leave only the Basotho 
with inflicted pains, the South African businesses were torched and vandalised by 
the angry Basotho who did not approve of the military interventions in their home 
country (Milazi, 1991). 
 
In a nutshell, the SADC as an organisation had very limited influence or control 
over South Africa in its actions in Lesotho, perhaps because it was a big economy 
and its security was at stake, compared to other nations that outside the borders. It 
is also clear that the Basotho politicians also leaned more towards South Africa as 
they realised that their protection and economic growth and stability were more 





5.5 Analysing Conflict Resolution 
A general understanding of the concept of conflict is a necessary initial step to 
analyse conflict. The conflict where arms are used, is a general phenomenon of 
social conflict resolution. As conflict involves a shift in behaviour, there are other 
elements such as the armed, non-armed, non-state actors in armed conflicts and it 
is important to include all these for better analysis.  In his concept on conflict, 
Wallenstein (2012) agrees that conflicts are solvable, as it is realistic that all 
conflicts, whether through armed forces or just violence among citizens, end up on 
negotiations as all actors recognise the need for peace. The 1998 Lesotho conflict 
was dealt with, as Wallenstein argues, because South Africa as a well-developed 
state, had to deal with conflict which was not only the traditional conflict material 
of state fighting wars among themselves, but dealing with conflict of less developed 
circumstances of intra-state conflicts. He argues that when conflict shifts from non-
armed to predominantly armed conflict behaviour, it creates the shift of issues and 
parties. The conflict resolution in such situations becomes difficult as it is no longer 
just resolving violence, but affects the relationship of parties as well as their 
incompatibilities. This analysis gives a picture of what happened during the 
Lesotho conflict as the relationship between South Africa, Lesotho and Botswana 
had been either positively and negatively affected (Wallensteen, 2012). 
 
5.6 Challenges for the intervention 
It has been cited that there were many challenges following the manner in which 
the interventions on the Lesotho conflict of 1998 were conducted.  The SADC 
organisation at that time had two Chairs: South Africa as the Chair of the SADC 
and Zimbabwe as the Chair of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. The 
division in chairing these two strategic institutions had initially brought differences 
between President Nelson Mandela and President Robert Mugabe as they did not 
agree on the principles of how the chairing of the two institutions should be 
managed.  President Mandela did not want the OPDS to be chaired indecently while 
President Mugabe wanted it independent of the Chair of the SADC.  The other 
challenge raised is why did South Africa intervened in the Lesotho conflict so 
quickly while it had just refused to participate in the DRC conflict within such a 
short space of time. The other question from Milanzi (1999) around the 
intervention, is whether there was some intelligence conducted before sending the 
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troops to Lesotho. On reply to this question, Likoti (2007) raises the issue that 
South Africa’s eagerness to move was simply to protect the Katse Dam, the project 
that benefits both Lesotho and South Africa. The reason for South Africa targeting 
to protect the dam first, before intervening at the Maseru unrest, was due to 
information that South Africa received that the Lesotho mutineers had threatened 
to blow up the dam should South Africa intervene in the conflict in Lesotho (Likoti, 
2007: P255-257). 
 
The other reason for South Africa to intervene swiftly was the security situation or 
instability within its borders. The conflict in Lesotho affected South Africa directly 
more than any other SADC state, and therefore it would be inconceivable for South 
Africa to have avoided a situation of that nature within its neighbour territories. It 
is through poor intelligence assessment that both South Africa and Lesotho 
suffered unnecessary casualties and loss of some lives among their soldiers. The 
failure to have time to plan for the intervention, lack of information on the data on 
Lesotho forces, such as knowledge of the location of ammunitions, arms movement 
and the total number of the Lesotho army force, created challenges for the strategic 
planning for interventions (Milazi, 1991: P274). 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
The intervention in the Lesotho conflict by South African military is however, 
considered by those who do not support such actions as aggressive and 
undermining the sovereignty of another state. South Africa is criticised for having 
entered into Lesotho without proper consultation or obtaining the mandate from 
either the SADC or the OPDS, hence the loss of lives, especially the soldiers as 
well as civilians during the looting in Maseru.  The counter view on this matter is 
that South Africa had done what any responsible government would have done, 
given the situation which prevailed. The Highlands Water Project was built at a 
cost of more than R7 billion and benefits both countries. When the juniors 
apprehended and displaced their seniors in the army, Ministers on house arrest, 
protesters occupying the King’s Royal Palace gates were enough to spell anarchy 
and an attempted coup. It would be unfair to think that South Africa should be 
expected to wait until the situation was uncontrollable and lives claimed as well as 
the damages to such prestigious water project (Milazi, 2007: P278-279). 
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According to Shaba ka Nkosi (1998), reporting for the Mail & Guardian, the 
intervention by SADC troops as represented by the SANDF and BDF, angered the 
Basotho at large as they considered the invasion of the King’s Palace as an attack 
on the Basotho nation. The conflict between the SADC troops and LDF ended with 
causalities within the SANDF which were least expected from the SADC side as 
they thought they would calm the situation without resistance.   
 
As it can be seen from the manner in which the Lesotho conflict was resolved, the 
state has a critical role to play by using the state agencies such as the united forces 
under the regional organisation which had been established for regional integration, 
hence regionalism in Africa being regarded as the core and catalyst for dealing with 
conflict, trade and cooperation in the region. 
 
The case of Lesotho conflict 1998 can be viewed as an indication on how the SADC 
member states react on the call for intervention depending on their interest in the 
state involved with conflicts. The response in Lesotho was obviously different due 
to South Africa’s involvement as it felt its security and peace threatened, unlike 
Botswana that was more concerned about the peace and security in the region rather 
than within its borders.  
According to Ramsbotham et al. (2006), the state remains the primary locus of 
identity for most people, and given the juridical monopoly on sovereignty still 
formally accorded to states within the current international system, all parties are 
still driven to compete for state control if they are to bring about revolutionary 
programmes.  The government is that key sector when it comes to conflict 
resolution, as the social and economic grievances are in the end expressed in 
political form. Conflict becomes endemic when party politics become inscriptively 
based and one community perceives that the state has been permanently ’captured’ 
by another, and is therefore driven to challenge the legitimacy of the state in order 
to change the situation. The Lesotho conflict of 1998 was subjected to the same 
situation as the political parties started battling for state control and resulted in the 
third-party interventions (Ramsbotham et al, 2006: P101) 
 
The SADC guidelines are criticised for lack of clarity, detail and coherence, and 
therefore reflects some shortcomings of the political and security agendas, 
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including its conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms. It is 
noted that the SADC elections guidelines are less about democratic election than 
about protecting the sovereign prerogatives of the member holding elections, and 
about controlling SADC election observers. Due to lack of policies on how to 
promote good governance, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, within 
the SADC, is probably because such values are not common to member states and 
therefore cannot be given the same level of attention. Although the SADC have 
forums where political and security issues are discussed, the lack of commitment 
from member states and the fact that SADC does not have mechanisms to force or 
compel the member states to take a particular position when it comes to conflict 
resolution, it leaves the member states at times with no option but to seek outside 
assistance, such as from the UN, AU, EU or its alliances in African states.  In the 
case of the Lesotho conflict of 1998, it is the South African government and the 
Botswana governments that took a quick decision to send their defence armies to 
make some interventions fronting as the SADC troops to resolve the conflicts, 
though South Africa has a more direct interest over the affairs of Lesotho than 
Botswana does (Oosthuizen, 2006: P325). 
 
The challenges facing the SADC in resolving conflicts in the region should be 
addressed in various forums, as should the harmonisation of regulations, policies 
and human rights issues as well as the socioeconomic, political and security 
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